搜搜做题作业网求食品安全的英汉对照短文
来源：学生作业帮 编辑：搜搜做题作业网作业帮 分类：综合作业 时间：2024/08/17 03:50:29
求食品安全的英汉对照短文
高级翻译考试，短文100-150词，急求~
高级翻译考试，短文100-150词，急求~
下面是我从华尔街日报上找的，希望对你有帮助
过去两年来中国的食品安全问题已为世人所知，而中国消费者自己更是很早就认识到了这一问题。石家庄三鹿集团公司(Sanlu Group Co.)生产的三聚氰胺污染奶粉则是中国食品安全问题的最新例证，这起事件导致至少六名婴儿夭折，30万儿童患病。但是在发生这些灾难之后，北京方面至今仍没有拿出一份经得起考验的解决方案，甚至连朝向这个方向有所前进都谈不上。看看中国人大常委会上周六通过的《食品安全法》吧，它清楚地表明中国政府徒有加强监管的意愿，却根本选错了下手的目标。
北京方面似乎认为食品安全问题是因中央监控不足、缺乏明晰的标准及流程所致。因此这部新法在北京设立了一个国家食品安全委员会(National Food Safety Commission)，以协调五大相关部委的工作，而后者将继续负责食品生产流程中各个环节的日常监管。该法案还要求大举制定规章政策，对食品生产中的方方面面加以规范。中国将制定国家食品安全标准，并针对食品添加剂以及杀虫剂、除草剂、重金属等相关物质的安全剂量加以规范。最后，这份法律要求中央部委研究出一套全国统一的食品安全危机应对法案，以防范类似三鹿奶粉这样的事件再次发生。
所有这一切从理论上讲很不错，但可能未必能起到效果。即便有人认为中国的问题是缺乏中央监管，但在实际工作中仅靠这些措施恐怕也难以解决实际上述问题。新法的条文几乎根本没有谈及如果具体实施这些措施。这部法律没有提供标准、日程安排、支出预算、从被监管方获得数据的流程以及明确的争端解决机制等。在中国，用于解决争议性问题的法律模糊不清，总是把所有细节都留待日后监管。往往是这样的监管根本就不会出现，法律也会变成一纸空文。这部新的《食品安全法》的相关标准和流程很可能也会遭遇同样的下场。
然而，这部新法的一个更大的问题是，这样的监管缺失从本质上并不是北京方面的问题。总体上条文当中已经有综合监管流程了。但就像多数国家那样，资金和专业经验的缺乏使得中国无法聘请到合格的检查及监督人员。中国有2亿多农民以及50多万家食品生产企业。食品生产系统太过庞大，以致于无法对生产流程的各个环节进行有效检查。
这里有个更好的办法，就是中国政府对农民和企业推出激励措施，要求他们加强质量自律，这样做的效果要好过只是弄出些听上去不错的法律条文。
最重要的改革措施之一是，允许现行的私人民法诉讼及破产体系真正地发挥作用，这样一来受害方将能在政府之外独立采取行动。唯有在公民可以通过诉诸法律获得赔偿的情况下食品安全体制才会真正影响食品生产企业的所作所为。此外，食品生产商必须知道，如果这种诉讼过于频繁或范围太广，它最后只能沦落到破产的地步。
三鹿案件极其清晰地说明，在今日中国，来自公民个人的制裁要求根本没有作用。法庭拒绝受理受害者家长提出的诉讼。总体来看，中国有关民事侵权的法律系统很不完善，而且监管当局很不鼓励在安全、健康领域出现问题时诉诸法律。中国的破产制度更是不完善，现行体系根本不能对企业业主构成威慑。中国的破产案都是政府促成的，为的是避免私人染指当事公司资产。三鹿的破产就是这样一个例证。在中国，旨在保护独立债权人、不受政府控制的破产闻所未闻。由于没有来自私人领域的有效惩戒，新《食品安全法》主张的行业标准可能难以收到实效。
另一个能真正解决中国食品安全问题的办法是承认中国的农业领域确实存在一些特殊的经济问题。中国的农、牧民都很贫穷而且受教育水平低下。他们当中大多数人仅靠务农入不敷出、只能靠一些非农业劳动勉强补贴度日。这种情况对许多初级食品生产企业来说同样适用，在中国市场上，许多产品的价格受到一定程度的控制，这使得许多食品企业无法通过调整价格来弥补生产成本，因而经常在停业边缘徘徊。这些个人和企业没有能力再去考虑食品安全标准、规章和流程的问题。过去的事例表明，只要有利可图，他们当中有些人就会铤而走险，不惜触犯法律。这就是为什么即便是死刑判决也不足以起到震慑作用。
由于这些问题在中国的经济现状下愈演愈烈，无论那部新法、抑或更详尽的规章都难以产生影响。中国食品安全问题真正的解决之道是对农业领域进行广泛改革，保障公民的财产权、并允许食品价格随行就市。在这种改革的起步阶段，要给予食品生产商更大激励措施，让他们关注食品质量，而且还要允许那些安全质量信誉良好的企业能从他们的优质产品上赚取足够高的回报。
近年来，随着宠物食品受三聚氰胺污染、鱼类产品细菌超标以及加工食品含有多种有毒物质等问题不断曝光，中国的食品安全问题引起了全世界的关注。中国的食品安全问题是一个罕见的例子：外国和中国的利益在共同面对一个属于中国体制内的重大问题。但是首要的一点是，北京方面必须认识到这个问题的本质，并相应地推行改革措施。从这个角度来看，新的《食品安全法》使中国政府再次错失良机。
The world has discovered in the past two years, and Chinese consumers have known for much longer, that China has a food-safety problem. The case of tainted milk from the Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group, which killed at least six infants and sickened 300,000 more, is just the latest example. But after all this time, Beijing is no closer to a lasting solution. Witness the Food Safety Law approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Saturday. It's a perfect example of how Beijing still is barking up the wrong regulatory tree.
The government seems to believe that the food-safety problem arises from inadequate central control and from a lack of clear standards and procedures. So the new law creates a Beijing-based National Food Safety Commission to coordinate the work of the five ministries that will retain day-to-day supervision over different phases of the food production process. The law also mandates a major round of rulemaking to regulate thoroughly every phase of the food production process. National standards will be set for food quality and safety in food additives and related items such as pesticides, herbicides and heavy-metal content. Finally, the law requires central government ministries to develop a unified national program for addressing food safety emergencies such as the Sanlu disaster.
All this activity looks good on paper, but it probably won't work. Even if one accepts that China's problem is a lack of centralized food regulation, there are few signs that any of these steps would address that shortcoming in practice. The law's text provides absolutely no details about how it will be implemented. The law includes no standards, no timeline, no budget, no procedure for obtaining the input of regulated parties and no clear way to resolve disputes. In China today, laws adopted on controversial topics are often vague and leave all the details to later regulation. Often such regulations never appear, rendering the law essentially meaningless. The standards and procedures portion of the Food Safety Law will likely meet the same fate.
But the bigger problem with the new law is that a lack of regulation per se is not Beijing's problem. Generally comprehensive regulations are already on the books. But as with most countries, China simply does not have the funding or expertise to hire enough qualified inspectors and regulators. China has more than 200 million farmers and more than 500,000 food production companies. The food production system is too vast to allow for meaningful inspection at all stages of the food production process.
It would have been better for Beijing to improve incentives for individual farmers and companies to control their own quality instead of simply retreating into more impressive-sounding regulation.
One of the most important reforms would be to allow the effective operation of the existing system of private civil litigation and bankruptcy that would allow injured parties to take action independent of the government. It is only when the citizen can use the court system to obtain damages that the food-safety system will ever affect the behavior food producers. As further support, the producer must know that the producer will be forced into bankruptcy if the frequency or extent of litigation is too great.
The Sanlu case has shown all too clearly that the threat of private sanction doesn't work in today's China. Courts have refused to accept lawsuits parents have attempted to file. In general, the tort law system is undeveloped and regulators strongly discourage its use in safety- and health-related matters. The bankruptcy system is even less developed, providing no real threat to any company owner under the current system. Bankruptcies that occur are orchestrated by the government to avoid private access to offending company assets. The bankruptcy of Sanlu is an example of this process. Bankruptcy as protection for independent creditors and outside of government control is still virtually unknown in China. Without these effective private sanctions, the standards imposed by the new food-safety law are unlikely to have any real effect.
A true solution to China's food-safety problem also would recognize certain economic facts on the ground in the agricultural sector. Chinese farmers and herders are poor and uneducated. Most operate at a loss and only survive by supplementing their income through nonagricultural activities. The same is true of many primary food processors, who sell into a market where partially controlled prices rarely allow them to recoup their costs of production and who are frequently on the verge of going out of business. These people and businesses do not believe they have the luxury of being concerned with standards and rules and procedures. Experience has shown that some will violate the law if they believe this will give them some financial benefit. This is why even the death penalty has not been a sufficient deterrent.
Since these problems are getting worse in China during the current economic situation, no new set of even more detailed rules is likely to have any impact. The only true solution to this element of the food-safety problem is a broader reform of China's agricultural sector geared toward strengthening property rights and allowing the market to set food prices. Such a broader reform would start by giving producers greater incentives to care about quality, as well as allowing those who can build reputations for safety and quality to earn sufficient returns to pay for higher-quality production.
China's food-safety problem has taken on international dimensions in recent years with melamine in pet food, bacteria in fish and various poisons in manufactured food products. Food safety is a rare case where both foreign and domestic interests are united in facing a major problem within the Chinese system. But first Beijing itself must understand the true nature of the problem, and implement reforms accordingly. From this perspective, the new food law represents another missed opportunity.
过去两年来中国的食品安全问题已为世人所知，而中国消费者自己更是很早就认识到了这一问题。石家庄三鹿集团公司(Sanlu Group Co.)生产的三聚氰胺污染奶粉则是中国食品安全问题的最新例证，这起事件导致至少六名婴儿夭折，30万儿童患病。但是在发生这些灾难之后，北京方面至今仍没有拿出一份经得起考验的解决方案，甚至连朝向这个方向有所前进都谈不上。看看中国人大常委会上周六通过的《食品安全法》吧，它清楚地表明中国政府徒有加强监管的意愿，却根本选错了下手的目标。
北京方面似乎认为食品安全问题是因中央监控不足、缺乏明晰的标准及流程所致。因此这部新法在北京设立了一个国家食品安全委员会(National Food Safety Commission)，以协调五大相关部委的工作，而后者将继续负责食品生产流程中各个环节的日常监管。该法案还要求大举制定规章政策，对食品生产中的方方面面加以规范。中国将制定国家食品安全标准，并针对食品添加剂以及杀虫剂、除草剂、重金属等相关物质的安全剂量加以规范。最后，这份法律要求中央部委研究出一套全国统一的食品安全危机应对法案，以防范类似三鹿奶粉这样的事件再次发生。
所有这一切从理论上讲很不错，但可能未必能起到效果。即便有人认为中国的问题是缺乏中央监管，但在实际工作中仅靠这些措施恐怕也难以解决实际上述问题。新法的条文几乎根本没有谈及如果具体实施这些措施。这部法律没有提供标准、日程安排、支出预算、从被监管方获得数据的流程以及明确的争端解决机制等。在中国，用于解决争议性问题的法律模糊不清，总是把所有细节都留待日后监管。往往是这样的监管根本就不会出现，法律也会变成一纸空文。这部新的《食品安全法》的相关标准和流程很可能也会遭遇同样的下场。
然而，这部新法的一个更大的问题是，这样的监管缺失从本质上并不是北京方面的问题。总体上条文当中已经有综合监管流程了。但就像多数国家那样，资金和专业经验的缺乏使得中国无法聘请到合格的检查及监督人员。中国有2亿多农民以及50多万家食品生产企业。食品生产系统太过庞大，以致于无法对生产流程的各个环节进行有效检查。
这里有个更好的办法，就是中国政府对农民和企业推出激励措施，要求他们加强质量自律，这样做的效果要好过只是弄出些听上去不错的法律条文。
最重要的改革措施之一是，允许现行的私人民法诉讼及破产体系真正地发挥作用，这样一来受害方将能在政府之外独立采取行动。唯有在公民可以通过诉诸法律获得赔偿的情况下食品安全体制才会真正影响食品生产企业的所作所为。此外，食品生产商必须知道，如果这种诉讼过于频繁或范围太广，它最后只能沦落到破产的地步。
三鹿案件极其清晰地说明，在今日中国，来自公民个人的制裁要求根本没有作用。法庭拒绝受理受害者家长提出的诉讼。总体来看，中国有关民事侵权的法律系统很不完善，而且监管当局很不鼓励在安全、健康领域出现问题时诉诸法律。中国的破产制度更是不完善，现行体系根本不能对企业业主构成威慑。中国的破产案都是政府促成的，为的是避免私人染指当事公司资产。三鹿的破产就是这样一个例证。在中国，旨在保护独立债权人、不受政府控制的破产闻所未闻。由于没有来自私人领域的有效惩戒，新《食品安全法》主张的行业标准可能难以收到实效。
另一个能真正解决中国食品安全问题的办法是承认中国的农业领域确实存在一些特殊的经济问题。中国的农、牧民都很贫穷而且受教育水平低下。他们当中大多数人仅靠务农入不敷出、只能靠一些非农业劳动勉强补贴度日。这种情况对许多初级食品生产企业来说同样适用，在中国市场上，许多产品的价格受到一定程度的控制，这使得许多食品企业无法通过调整价格来弥补生产成本，因而经常在停业边缘徘徊。这些个人和企业没有能力再去考虑食品安全标准、规章和流程的问题。过去的事例表明，只要有利可图，他们当中有些人就会铤而走险，不惜触犯法律。这就是为什么即便是死刑判决也不足以起到震慑作用。
由于这些问题在中国的经济现状下愈演愈烈，无论那部新法、抑或更详尽的规章都难以产生影响。中国食品安全问题真正的解决之道是对农业领域进行广泛改革，保障公民的财产权、并允许食品价格随行就市。在这种改革的起步阶段，要给予食品生产商更大激励措施，让他们关注食品质量，而且还要允许那些安全质量信誉良好的企业能从他们的优质产品上赚取足够高的回报。
近年来，随着宠物食品受三聚氰胺污染、鱼类产品细菌超标以及加工食品含有多种有毒物质等问题不断曝光，中国的食品安全问题引起了全世界的关注。中国的食品安全问题是一个罕见的例子：外国和中国的利益在共同面对一个属于中国体制内的重大问题。但是首要的一点是，北京方面必须认识到这个问题的本质，并相应地推行改革措施。从这个角度来看，新的《食品安全法》使中国政府再次错失良机。
The world has discovered in the past two years, and Chinese consumers have known for much longer, that China has a food-safety problem. The case of tainted milk from the Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group, which killed at least six infants and sickened 300,000 more, is just the latest example. But after all this time, Beijing is no closer to a lasting solution. Witness the Food Safety Law approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Saturday. It's a perfect example of how Beijing still is barking up the wrong regulatory tree.
The government seems to believe that the food-safety problem arises from inadequate central control and from a lack of clear standards and procedures. So the new law creates a Beijing-based National Food Safety Commission to coordinate the work of the five ministries that will retain day-to-day supervision over different phases of the food production process. The law also mandates a major round of rulemaking to regulate thoroughly every phase of the food production process. National standards will be set for food quality and safety in food additives and related items such as pesticides, herbicides and heavy-metal content. Finally, the law requires central government ministries to develop a unified national program for addressing food safety emergencies such as the Sanlu disaster.
All this activity looks good on paper, but it probably won't work. Even if one accepts that China's problem is a lack of centralized food regulation, there are few signs that any of these steps would address that shortcoming in practice. The law's text provides absolutely no details about how it will be implemented. The law includes no standards, no timeline, no budget, no procedure for obtaining the input of regulated parties and no clear way to resolve disputes. In China today, laws adopted on controversial topics are often vague and leave all the details to later regulation. Often such regulations never appear, rendering the law essentially meaningless. The standards and procedures portion of the Food Safety Law will likely meet the same fate.
But the bigger problem with the new law is that a lack of regulation per se is not Beijing's problem. Generally comprehensive regulations are already on the books. But as with most countries, China simply does not have the funding or expertise to hire enough qualified inspectors and regulators. China has more than 200 million farmers and more than 500,000 food production companies. The food production system is too vast to allow for meaningful inspection at all stages of the food production process.
It would have been better for Beijing to improve incentives for individual farmers and companies to control their own quality instead of simply retreating into more impressive-sounding regulation.
One of the most important reforms would be to allow the effective operation of the existing system of private civil litigation and bankruptcy that would allow injured parties to take action independent of the government. It is only when the citizen can use the court system to obtain damages that the food-safety system will ever affect the behavior food producers. As further support, the producer must know that the producer will be forced into bankruptcy if the frequency or extent of litigation is too great.
The Sanlu case has shown all too clearly that the threat of private sanction doesn't work in today's China. Courts have refused to accept lawsuits parents have attempted to file. In general, the tort law system is undeveloped and regulators strongly discourage its use in safety- and health-related matters. The bankruptcy system is even less developed, providing no real threat to any company owner under the current system. Bankruptcies that occur are orchestrated by the government to avoid private access to offending company assets. The bankruptcy of Sanlu is an example of this process. Bankruptcy as protection for independent creditors and outside of government control is still virtually unknown in China. Without these effective private sanctions, the standards imposed by the new food-safety law are unlikely to have any real effect.
A true solution to China's food-safety problem also would recognize certain economic facts on the ground in the agricultural sector. Chinese farmers and herders are poor and uneducated. Most operate at a loss and only survive by supplementing their income through nonagricultural activities. The same is true of many primary food processors, who sell into a market where partially controlled prices rarely allow them to recoup their costs of production and who are frequently on the verge of going out of business. These people and businesses do not believe they have the luxury of being concerned with standards and rules and procedures. Experience has shown that some will violate the law if they believe this will give them some financial benefit. This is why even the death penalty has not been a sufficient deterrent.
Since these problems are getting worse in China during the current economic situation, no new set of even more detailed rules is likely to have any impact. The only true solution to this element of the food-safety problem is a broader reform of China's agricultural sector geared toward strengthening property rights and allowing the market to set food prices. Such a broader reform would start by giving producers greater incentives to care about quality, as well as allowing those who can build reputations for safety and quality to earn sufficient returns to pay for higher-quality production.
China's food-safety problem has taken on international dimensions in recent years with melamine in pet food, bacteria in fish and various poisons in manufactured food products. Food safety is a rare case where both foreign and domestic interests are united in facing a major problem within the Chinese system. But first Beijing itself must understand the true nature of the problem, and implement reforms accordingly. From this perspective, the new food law represents another missed opportunity.